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Non-technical summary
This study provides an improved understanding of the dynamics of corporate ow-
nership and firm survival in Germany. In particular, we consider the role of different
types of shareholders as sellers and buyers of control blocks. The empirical analysis
is based on a sample of over 1,500 large and medium-sized German corporations for
the years 1986–1995.
There are two major findings. First, poor performance and high financial pressure
make firms more likely to fail and to experience a change in ownership. This latter
finding contrasts with the widespread belief that acquisitions target well-performing
firms to the disadvantage of shareholders and other stakeholders. Rather, our finding
is consistent with the view that acquisitions can have a disciplining effect on poorly
performing firms. Our second major finding is that both the type of seller and the
type of buyer matter in transfers of corporate control. This implies that not taking
into account different shareholder types in control transactions can bias estimation
results. This is a classical omitted variables problem.
For illustration, take the example of ownership concentration. We find that con-
centration reduces the likelihood of a change in ownership when we do not control
for the type of seller. Controlling for the type of seller, we find that (1) this effect
is not monotonous but rather non-linear in the degree of ownership concentration,
and that (2) this non-linearity depends on whether a firm is initially under tight or
under loose control of shareholders. More precisely, for firms with a highly dispersed
ownership structure the probability of a change in ownership increases with share
concentration, but it decreases when concentration exceeds a particular level. Firms
with three or four equally large shareholders are most likely to be acquired.
The other findings of this study can be summarized as follows: Irrespective of the
type of the controlling shareholder, firms are more likely to fail and to experience
a change in ownership when financial pressure is high and firm size is small. In
contrast, complex ownership structures, reflected for example in cross ownership,
reduce the likelihood for a change in control. Concerning the type of seller, private
owners are more likely to sell a firm when financial pressure increases, but corporate
shareholders are not. This is consistent with evidence that corporate owners have
access to internal capital markets, and that private owners face some liquidity cons-
traints. Regarding the buyers of control blocks, large firms are less likely to be sold
to a corporate shareholder than to the government, and they are even less likely
to be sold to a private shareholder. Again, the latter finding suggests that private
owners are liquidity-constrained. Interestingly, firms under control of cross-owned
shareholders, which are by definition corporate shareholders, are more likely to be
sold to the public or the government, but less likely to be sold to another corporate
investor. This indicates that, if complex ownership structures are dissolved, then
this is done either by spreading shares widely or by selling control blocks to the
government.
Our findings have policy implications. The finding that poorly performing firms are
more likely to be acquired is consistent with the notion that acquisitions can play
an important governance role. At the same time, we find that firms with complex
ownership structures, reflected for example in cross ownership, are less likely to ex-
perience an acquisition. This indicates that ownership complexity acts as a takeover
deterrent. In combination, these results suggest that a policy attempting to reduce
ownership complexity could make the market for corporate control more active. In
turn, tighter managerial control by market forces could enhance the efficiency of
corporate governance.
1 Introduction
Dynamics in firm ownership are beginning to form a new element in the complex cor-
porate governance framework. Transfers of corporate control occur more frequently
than often assumed because the usual emphasis lies on hostile takeovers rather than
block acquisitions. For the US, Barcley and Holderness (1991) report that during the
years 1978–1982 the number of registered block trades was about twice as high as
the number of tender offers. Bethel et al. (1998) document that firms from the For-
tune 500 list are three times as likely to experience a block acquisition by an activist
investor than a hostile takeover or leveraged buyout. In Germany and in other Con-
tinental European countries, hostile takeovers are rare (Franks and Mayer, 1998),
but the frequency of block trades is comparable to the US (see Franks and Mayer,
2001, for Germany; see Renneboog, 2000, for Belgium).
Along with evidence on the frequency of changes in corporate control, evidence is
accumulating on the causes of control transfers. Poor performance (Denis and Sarin,
1999; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001), high financial pressure (Zingales, 1998), and
economic shocks (Denis and Sarin, 1999) are identified as factors that make control
transfers more likely. In turn, not adapting governance structures can make firm
failure more likely (Kole and Lehn, 1999). However, evidence on the transactions
themselves, in particular the identity of trading partners of control blocks, is sparse.
Previous studies limit their attention to changes in managerial ownership and the
associated consequences for a firm (Kole and Lehn, 1999; Denis and Sarin, 1999), or
the effects of block purchases by activist, financial, and strategic investors (Bethel et
al., 1998). To our knowledge, there is no study that analyzes simultaneously which
type of shareholder is more likely to buy or to sell control blocks. Likewise, prior
research does not examine whether firm-specific characteristics vary in their impact
on the probability of control transfers, in particular whether their impact depends
on the type of seller or buyer of those control blocks.
This study aims to provide a better understanding of the determinants of firm
failure and control transfers, in particular the role of the type of controlling share-
holders. The analysis is based on a sample of over 1,500 large and medium-sized
German corporations for the years 1986–1995. We find that, irrespective of the type
of the controlling shareholder, firms are both more likely to fail and to experience
a change in ownership when performance is poor, financial pressure is high, and
firm size is small. In contrast, complex ownership structures, reflected for example
in cross ownership, reduce the likelihood of a control transfer. Concerning the type
of seller, we find that the impact of ownership concentration on the likelihood of
a control sale is non-linear. More precisely, for firms that do not have a dominant
shareholder the likelihood of control change increases with share concentration, but
it decreases for firms that are under control of a dominant shareholder. In combi-
nation, this suggests that firms with medium share concentration are most likely to
be acquired. In addition, a private owner is more likely than a corporate owner to
sell a firm under financial pressure. Regarding the type of buyer, we find that larger
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firms are most likely to be sold to the government or to the public, but least likely
to a private shareholder.
This study proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a short overview of the theore-
tical and empirical literature on the determinants of firm failure and control changes
as well as the role of different types of buyers and sellers in control transactions.
The literature is condensed into a set of hypotheses which are tested in the empi-
rical analysis. Section 3 describes the data used in this study and the frequency of
failure and control changes. It also gives some preliminary evidence on the causes
of failures and changes in control based on descriptive statistics. Section 4 examines
the determinants of control transfers and failure in a multivariate framework. Sub-
sequently, we investigate this issue by (a) neglecting the types of owners of control
blocks, (b) examining the type of seller, and (c) examining the type of buyer. Section
5 concludes.
2 Literature and resulting hypotheses
To structure our empirical analysis of dynamics in corporate ownership and firm
survival, we formulate a set of hypotheses based upon the existing theoretical and
empirical literature. These hypotheses relate to predictions concerning the determi-
nants of control transfers and firm failure (Section 2.1) and predictions concerning
which type of investor is likely to sell (Section 2.2) or to buy a company (Section
2.3).
2.1 Control transfers and firm failure
Concerning the likelihood of a control transfer and firm failure we hypothesize:
Hypothesis C1: Control transfers and failure are more likely for firms with poor
performance.
Hypothesis C2: Control transfers and failure are more likely for firms with high
financial pressure.
Hypothesis C3: Control transfers are less likely for firms with very high or very
low concentration of ownership, and failure is less likely for firms with high
ownership concentration.
Hypothesis C4: Control transfers and failure are less likely for firms with complex
ownership structures.
Hypothesis C5: Control transfers and failure are less likely for large firms.
The current theoretical view of control transfers is largely shaped by two conflic-
ting effects of blockholder control (Kahan, 1993; Bebchuk, 1994). On the one hand,
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transferring control to a more effective management team could improve efficiency.
On the other hand, the acquirer’s primary motive may be to loot the firm to the dis-
advantage of small shareholders. Empirical evidence on the consequences of changes
in control suggests that they bring about improvements (Barcley and Holderness,
1991). The evidence also indicates that changes in control occur more often when
performance is poor; for the US, see Bethel et al., 1998, Denis and Sarin, 1999, and
Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001; for the UK, see Franks et al., 1999; and for Germany,
see Ko¨ke, 2000). Similarly, a number of studies suggests that performance is a useful
predictor for firm failure (e.g., Altman, 1968; Powell, 1997; Astebro and Winter,
2001). Hence, we expect that control transfers and firm failure are more likely when
performance is poor (C1).
The second hypothesis (C2) considers the role of capital structure. Mitchell and
Mulherin (1996) argue that changes in the firm’s growth opportunities or leverage
could make adjustments in ownership necessary. Consistent with this view, Zinga-
les (1998) reports that following deregulation in the US trucking industry in 1977
firms were confronted with increasing leverage, and that this has led to a higher
probability of market exit. Other empirical studies on firm failure confirm this role
of financial pressure (Altman, 1968; Powell, 1997). Thus, firms with high financial
pressure should be more likely to become subject to a takeover or failure.
The third hypothesis (C3) states that ownership concentration has an inverse-
ly U-shaped impact on the likelihood of a control transfer and a negative impact
on failure. Grossman and Hart (1980) argue that a precondition for effective hosti-
le takeovers is concentrated share ownership because shareholders would prefer to
free-ride under dispersed ownership. Similarly, Burkart et al. (2000) show that the
incumbent and the new controlling shareholder prefer to trade a block rather than
sell shares to the public and, in a second step, accumulate those dispersed shares
because they anticipate the free-riding behavior of small shareholders associated
with tender offers. Hence, an ex ante larger concentration of shares should make
control transfers more likely. In contrast, Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1993) argue that
takeovers require low concentration of ownership and high market liquidity because
only then are capital markets able to determine the necessity of a takeover. The few
cases of hostile takeovers in Germany support Holmstro¨m and Tirole: In all cases
the shares of the takeover target were widely dispersed (Franks and Mayer, 1998).
However, the significant number of non-hostile control transfers in Germany indica-
tes that block trades occur despite of typically large share concentration, which is
typical for German corporations (Ko¨ke, 2000; Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001). In
sum, we expect the costs of a takeover to be the largest for both very high and very
low concentration of ownership. The impact of share concentration on firm failure is
less ambiguous. Higher concentration implies that the scope for agency conflicts is
reduced, and hence large shareholders can alleviate the agency problem via better
monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Therefore, the likelihood of failure should
decline in ownership concentration.
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The fourth hypothesis (C4) considers the complexity of ownership as a barrier to
control transfers or failure. Managers of pyramid firms are probably more likely to
resist the sale of control when selling parts of such a conglomerate implies a loss of
organizational capital. Likewise, pyramids can manifest managerial empires and as
such have a value to managers (Franks and Mayer, 1995). Similarly, cross ownership
could deter changes in control (Adams, 1994; Wenger and Kaserer, 1998; Bebchuk et
al., 2000). We also expect failure to be less likely for firms that are part of pyramids or
are controlled by cross-owned shareholders because information asymmetries should
be smaller within such organizational structures, and therefore financial aid easier
accessible. Besides, empire building could also prevent management from closing
down firms even in mature industries (Jensen, 1986).
The fifth hypothesis (C5) establishes that firm size makes control transfers or
failure less likely. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that the market for corporate
control is less liquid as firm size increases. Bethel et al. (1998) and Mulherin and
Boone (2000) provide empirical evidence that smaller firms are more likely to become
takeover targets. Concerning firm failure, bankruptcy should be less likely for very
large firms. If very large firms get into financial trouble, this might give management
the opportunity to be eligible for help from outside creditors or the government. Such
firms can be too big to let them fail. A recent example is the case of the construction
conglomerate Holzmann AG. After having come into severe financial difficulties in
the year 2000, creditors agreed – under the lead of German chancellor Schro¨der – to
extend existing credits to Holzmann by another 2 billion DM.
2.2 Control transfers: the type of sellers
Taking into account different types of sellers of control blocks, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis S1: A poorly performing firm is less likely to be sold when owned by
a private shareholder than when owned by a corporate shareholder, but most
likely when no dominant shareholder exists.
Hypothesis S2: A firm facing financial pressure is less likely to be sold when
owned by a corporate shareholder than when owned by a private shareholder,
but least likely when no dominant shareholder exists.
The first hypothesis (S1) argues that poor performance has a different impact
on the likelihood of a control transfer, depending on the type of the seller. Since
private owners are often not only financially deeply involved in the respective firm,
for example because they belong to the founding family, a private owner should be
less likely than a corporate owner to sell a poorly performing firm. In contrast, we
expect that a poorly performing firm not having a dominant shareholder (i.e. having
a dispersed shareholder base) is even more likely to be sold because an incoming
strong shareholder should be able to fix governance problems. Similarly, Holmstro¨m
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and Tirole (1993) argue that acquisitions should be more likely when ownership is
not concentrated.
The second hypothesis (S2) follows from considerations that different types of
shareholders have different access to financial resources. If a firm faces high financial
pressure, reflected for example in a large burden of debt or low liquidity, we expect
a private owner to be most likely to sell because of wealth constraints. In contrast,
a corporate owner often commands over an internal capital market which can be
used to transfer cash between divisions; see Lamont (1997) for evidence from the
US oil industry. Firms without a dominant shareholder should be least likely to sell
because they can issue further shares to the public to ease liquidity problems.
2.3 Control transfers: the type of buyers
Taking into account different types of buyers of control blocks, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis B1: If a poorly performing firm is sold, then it is most likely to be
sold to a corporate shareholder, less likely to a private shareholder, and least
likely to the public.
Hypothesis B2: If a firm under financial pressure is sold, then it is most likely to
be sold to the public, less likely to a corporate shareholder, and least likely to
a private shareholder.
Hypothesis B3: If a large firm is sold, then it is most likely to be sold to the public,
less likely to a corporate shareholder, and least likely to a private shareholder.
The first hypothesis (B1) establishes that poor performance has a different impact
on the likelihood of a control transfer, depending on the type of buyer. Barcley and
Holderness (1991) show that stock prices react positively to a change in the identity
of the blockholder. However, we argue that efficiency gains depend on the type of the
buyer of the control block. If performance is poor, a company should be more likely
to be bought by an investor that has a superior monitoring technology. Examples
of such a technology are knowledge of the respective industry, knowledge of how to
detect deficiencies in an inefficiently governed takeover target, or knowledge of how
to conduct corporate restructuring. Since these kinds of knowledge are typically
acquired only in business practice, we expect financial firms (such as banks) and
non-financial firms to be most able to realize any such efficiency gains. In contrast,
poorly performing firms should be less likely to sell previously concentrated shares
to several large or many small investors (henceforth: the public) because this would
create the well-known free-rider problem (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Shleifer and
Vishny, 1986). Hence, bringing the organization back on track would be even more
difficult without a strong controlling shareholder.
The second hypothesis (B2) considers the impact of financial pressure. If a firm’s
debt burden is high or liquidity is low, a corporate shareholder should be more likely
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to buy this firm than a private shareholder. The reason is that private shareholders
are typically more wealth-constrained than corporate shareholders. However, when
liquidity is poor, selling shares to the public should be an even better alternative
than selling to another firm, in particular in the wake of major investment programs
(Pagano and Ro¨ell, 1996).
Finally, the third hypothesis (B3) focuses on firm size. Firm size can reduce the
likelihood of acquisition (Bethel et al., 1998; Mulherin and Boone, 2000). Therefore,
due to wealth constraints private shareholders should be least likely to buy large
firms. In turn, large firms should be most likely to be sold to the public.
3 Data description
The sample comprises 7,577 observations relating to 1,510 firms over the years 1986–
1995. For all firms, the data set contains annual information on firm performance,
capital structure, ownership structure, and firm size. The panel is unbalanced in the
sense that firms can enter the sample after the year 1986 and exit the sample before
1995.
More specifically, the data set contains medium-sized and large German corpora-
tions, about half of which are non-listed (Table 1). Taking the number of all German
corporations in the year 1992 as a benchmark, listed firms are well-covered (68.9%
of all listed firms). In fact, the sample includes almost all corporations listed on any
German stock exchange, excluding firms in the financial service industries and firms
under strict government regulation such as utility, traffic, and telecommunications;
see also Appendix A. Sample firms operate under three different legal forms: public
corporations (AG and, to a much smaller extent, KGaA) and private corporati-
ons (GmbH). Coverage of non-listed corporations is much weaker, in particular for
GmbH firms (0.03% of all GmbH firms). However, choosing corporations with total
sales exceeding 100 million DM as the benchmark, we find that the sample contains
about 48% of all large public corporations, and more than three percent of all large
private corporations. Therefore, the sample is particularly representative for large
listed and non-listed public corporations.
A crucial element of our data set is detailed information on the firms’ ownership
structure. Ownership information is available for the years 1986–1996. Applying
a concept of control, which is based on ultimate share ownership (Ko¨ke, 2000; see
Appendix B), we identify whether a firm in any given year has a dominant controlling
shareholder or not, and of which type this controlling shareholder is. In a second
step, based on changes in the name of the so-defined ultimate owner we determine
whether a change in control takes place. For the cases in which balance sheet data
time series end before 1996 we determine whether this lack of balance sheet data is
due to an acquisition or bankruptcy in the year ahead. In sum, we obtain information
on the survival status (transfer of control, no transfer of control, or failure) for all
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sample firms. Since the last year for which the survival status can be calculated is
1996, and since the present analysis focuses on the year prior to a change in control
or failure, the sample used for the analysis covers the years 1986–1995.
In the data set, five types of ultimate owners can be identified: private, financial
firms, non-financial firms, government authorities, and no single dominant sharehol-
der (dispersed shares). Due to the limited number of cases we aggregate financial
and non-financial shareholders as corporate shareholders. Appendix A contains a
detailed description of the data sources and the procedure applied to construct the
sample. Appendix B gives a technical description of the concept of control used to
identify the ultimate owner of each sample firm. And Appendix C summarizes the
definition of all variables used in this study.
The following Section 3.1 describes the frequency of changes in ownership and the
frequency of the different types of shareholders either acting as a buyer or as a seller
of sample firms. Section 3.2 provides some preliminary evidence on the determinants
of control transfers and failure based on descriptive statistics.
3.1 Frequency of control transfers and failure
Table 2 shows that in most cases (91.9% of firm years) neither a transfer of control
nor firm failure occurs. For 38 firms (0.5% of firm years) we observe failure (defined
as bankruptcy, insolvency, or voluntary liquidation). A change in control occurs in
576 cases (7.6% of firm years). When a change in control takes place, a corporate
shareholder is usually the new owner of the firm (61.3%). A firm is less likely to be
acquired by a private shareholder, and even less likely to be bought by a few large
or many small shareholders (category dispersed). However, a firm is least likely to
be sold to the government.
What is also evident from Table 2 is that the largest fraction of sample firms is
ultimately owned by a corporate shareholder (50.2%), a smaller fraction is owned
by a private shareholder (33.2%) or by the government (5.3%). For 11.3% of all firm
years there is no single dominant shareholder. As mentioned above, firms classified
as ’dispersed’ are owned either by a small number of similarly large shareholders or
by a large number of very small shareholders.
Overall, changes in ultimate ownership affect a significant number of sample firms.
Out of 1,510 firms, 1,079 firms (71.5%) do not experience any change in control
during the 1986–1996 period. Vice versa, more than one quarter of all firms included
in the sample experiences at least one change in ownership during the sample period.
In about 21% of all firms the ultimate owner changes once, in about six percent twice,
and in about one percent three or four times. But overall, several changes in control
in the same firm are not very likely.
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3.2 Descriptive evidence
Table 3 provides first evidence on the determinants of firm failure and transfers
of control. It reports mean (columns 1-3) and median (columns 4-6) values of the
variables that have been identified in Section 2 as potentially important determinants
of changes in control and failure. These statistics are used to compare firms that
experience a change in ownership or failure in the year ahead with firms that survive,
i.e. do not experience a change in ownership and do not fail. For further descriptive
evidence on the determinants of acquisition and failure using a larger variety of
measures of firm-specific characteristics, see Ko¨ke (2001b).
Table 3 shows that failing firms and firms experiencing a change in control per-
form significantly worse than surviving firms not experiencing a change in control.
In addition, performance of failing firms, measured as industry-adjusted return on
assets, is worse than performance of acquired firms; this difference is significant at
the one-percent level. An analogous relationship is found for financial pressure. Mea-
sured by the debt-to-assets ratio, financial pressure is significantly larger for firms
that fail or experience a change in control, compared with surviving firms that do
not experience any major change in ownership. In turn, financial pressure is larger
for failing firms than for firms that are acquired (significant at the one-percent level).
Firm size provides another clear distinction between failing, surviving, and acqui-
red firms. Firms that go bankrupt have, on average, total assets of about 660 million
DM, and firms that are acquired have total assets of 960 million DM. Both figures
are significantly below the respective figure for surviving firms, for which total assets
amount to over 1,700 million DM. Similar differences are found for total sales and
the number of employees as measures of firm size (not reported). Hence, firm size
appears to reduce the likelihood of failure as well as a change in ownership.
Furthermore, ownership is significantly more concentrated in surviving firms, which
do not experience a change in control, compared with failing firms and firms ex-
periencing a change in control. For firms with a control change, this result holds
irrespective whether ownership concentration is measured by the Herfindahl index,
the size of the largest block, or a dummy variable indicating whether the respective
firm has an ultimate owner according to our concept of control (see Appendix B)
or not. However, failing and acquired firms are not significantly different in terms
of ownership concentration. Furthermore, Table 3 indicates that a significantly lar-
ger fraction of firms survives when being part of a pyramid or being controlled by
a cross-owned shareholder. In fact, none of the firms that declare bankruptcy is
controlled by a shareholder that is part of the web of large German financial and
non-financial conglomerates. The level of control, our measure of the height of the
pyramid through which a firm is controlled, is significantly lower for firms that fail,
compared with firms that survive and both, do or do not experience a change in
control. In combination, the results on ownership structure suggest that complex
ownership structures as reflected in large pyramids and cross ownership appear to
reduce the likelihood of firm failure, but not the likelihood of control transfers.
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4 Empirical models for control transfers and fai-
lure
The descriptive evidence discussed in Section 3.2 provides a first indication of the
determinants of control transfers and firm failure. However, this evidence is only
preliminary because the reported correlations do not imply any causal relationship.
Therefore, we now analyze the issues related to transfers of corporate control and
firm failure in a multivariate analysis, controlling for the fact that different variables
can simultaneously affect the probability of acquisition or failure.
In Section 4.1, we first specify a multinomial logit (MNL) model for the three
outcomes change (in ultimate ownership), failure, and no change (i.e. no change in
ultimate ownership and no failure). In Section 4.2 we extend this basic model by
interacting all explanatory variables with indicators for the types of owners. This
allows for different effects of these variables depending on the type of owner, and thus
for testing the hypotheses regarding the type of seller (Section 2.2). In Section 4.3,
we refine the set of outcomes by subdividing the outcome change into four separate
outcomes depending on the type of buyer. This extension of the basic MNL model
allows for testing the hypotheses regarding the type of buyer (Section 2.3).
The MNL model is widely used in empirical studies because its globally concave
likelihood function makes estimation straightforward.1 A drawback of this method
is that it relies on relatively strong assumptions regarding the stochastic structure
of the model. To address this concern, in Section 4.4 we test the robustness of
the MNL results using a mixed multinomial logit model (MMNL), which is much
more flexible in comparison with the MNL model. As it turns out, the additional
assumptions of the MNL model are rejected, but the findings from the MNL model
remain qualitatively unchanged.
In all regressions, we use one-year-lagged values of firm-specific characteristics as
explanatory variables. These characteristics include the measures of performance,
financial pressure, firm size, and ownership structure described in the previous sec-
tion. The selection of these variables is based on an extensive descriptive analysis
of which variables are useful to explain acquisition and failure (Ko¨ke, 2001b). Ne-
vertheless, in Section 4.5 we check whether our findings are sensitive to the use of
alternative measures of the selected firm-specific characteristics.2
4.1 Determinants of control transfers and firm failure
In a first step, we examine the impact of firm performance, financial pressure, and
other firm-specific characteristics on ownership change and failure in a simple multi-
nomial logit model (MNL). For the moment, we ignore the different types of owners.
1 See Greene (1997, p. 920) for a textbook presentation of the MNL model.
2 For the definition of all variables employed, see Appendix C.
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In this model, there are three possible outcomes: change (in ultimate owner), failure,
and no change.
Table 4 shows the results of two specifications. In Model (1), the outcome pro-
babilities are modeled to depend on the lagged values of the firm characteristics
only, ignoring the ownership types altogether. As the reference outcome relative to
which the coefficients will be interpreted, we choose the outcome no change because
this outcome is the most frequent. For example, the significantly negative parameter
estimate for performance (measured as industry-adjusted return on assets) in the
column change implies that the probability of a control transfer instead of no change
in control falls with rising performance.
We find a significantly negative impact of performance on the likelihood of ac-
quisition and failure. Hence, a test of the null hypothesis that Hypothesis C1 is
incorrect is statistically rejected. Poor performance appears to make a change in
control as well as firm failure more likely. The effect of performance on failure is
significantly more pronounced than its effect on change. Our finding on the effect
of performance for acquisition and failure is consistent with evidence from the US
(Powell, 1997; Denis and Sarin, 1999; Astebro and Winter, 2001, Maksimovic and
Phillips, 2001). The results in Table 4 also support Hypothesis C2: Firms with
high financial pressure, here reflected in a high debt-to-assets ratio, have a larger
probability to experience a change in control, and an even larger probability to fail.
Hypothesis C3 predicts a nonlinear impact of ownership concentration on the
likelihood of a control transfer. We find support for this hypothesis. To test for a
non-linear impact of ownership concentration, the model includes a second-order
polynomial of the Herfindahl index. For the change outcome, the estimated poly-
nomial has a negative first derivative in the domain of the Herfindahl index which
is, by definition, bounded between zero and one. This finding is consistent with
Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1993) who argue that the probability of a takeover should
decrease with increasing ownership concentration. We will come back to this finding
in Section 4.2, where it will turn out that this effect depends on the previous control
status. Concerning the probability of failure, the results indicate a negative impact
of ownership concentration for concentration levels that are typical for German firms
(Ko¨ke, 2001a). However, this effect is statistically insignificant.
Firms that are part of a pyramid or controlled by a cross-owned shareholder are
less likely to experience a change in control, as Hypothesis C4 predicts, but this
effect is not or only weakly significant. However, we find that the higher is the level
in a pyramid at which the ultimate shareholder is located, the higher is the proba-
bility for a transfer of control. One interpretation of this effect could be that due to
information asymmetries monitoring becomes increasingly difficult with higher py-
ramid structure, potentially implying greater organizational inefficiency. This would
explain why pyramids tend to sell firms that operate on their (organizational) pe-
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riphery.3 Concerning failure, we cannot find any significant impact of pyramids on
the probability of failure. Since no firm with cross-owned shareholders failed in our
sample, no finite coefficient for failure can be identified.
Finally, Hypothesis C5 is strongly supported. Taking the natural logarithm of
total assets as a measure of firm size, a change in control as well as a failure is
less likely to occur for large firms. This confirms that firm size works as a kind of
takeover deterrent (Bethel et al., 1998; Mulherin and Boone, 2000), but also as a
shelter against failure.
Table 4 also shows the results of another model that we call Model (2). It is
equivalent to Model (1) except that we add indicator variables for the type of owner.
We find that private owners tend to sell their blocks less frequently compared with
corporate owners. A likelihood ratio test shows that these indicators cannot be
ignored. Thus, taking into account different types of owners is important. Note
that the other parameter estimates hardly change; one exception is the indicator
for cross ownership, for which the coefficient becomes more pronounced. Given the
estimates for the ownership type indicators, this new result for cross ownership was
to be expected because cross-held firms are, by definition, controlled by firms. So the
coefficient for cross ownership in Model (1) partly picks up the effect of the ownership
type. Since corporate owners sell their controlling share blocks more frequently than
private owners, this leads to a bias of the parameter estimate in Model (1) which is
removed in Model (2).
4.2 The type of seller in control transfers
In the previous section, different types of owners were accounted for by including
identity indicators into the specification of Model (2). In this section, we also take
into account different types of owners, but now we examine whether the impact of
explanatory variables varies depending on the type of seller, as suggested in Section
2.2. For example, due to wealth constraints particularly private blockholders should
be less able to provide extra capital to a firm in financial difficulties, and in turn
be more likely to sell this firm. Therefore, we expect the parameter associated with
the impact of financial pressure on the change probability to be larger when the
firm is owned by a private shareholder, compared with a firm that is owned by a
corporate shareholder. Controlling for the type of owner is also important from the
methodological point of view. If the outcome probabilities differ by type of owner,
ignoring these effects leads to biased parameter estimates unless the explanatory
3 An alternative interpretation could be that longer control chains in pyramids automatically
increase the likelihood that one of the chain firms experiences a change in ultimate ownership.
In consequence, the likelihood of a control transfer for a sample firm would increase when
this firm is low in a pyramid. However, if the dummies for pyramids and cross ownership have
any additional impact besides the impact of the height of a pyramid (as shown in our second
specification in Table 4), these effects would be robust against this critique.
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variables do not systematically differ across shareholder types. This can be seen as
a classical omitted variables problem.
We therefore extend our model by allowing the parameters to vary by the type of
seller, i.e. by the type of owner before an eventual control transaction takes place.
Each explanatory variable is fully interacted with indicator variables for each of the
following shareholder types: private, corporate, government, and dispersed; see also
Section 3.1. In this way we allow for and can test the hypotheses formulated in
Section 2.2.
Table 5 shows the results of this fully interacted model. It is to be read as follows:
The last column shows the parameter estimates for failure relative to no change
as before in Table 4. The first column presents the parameter estimates for change
relative to no change, not interacted with the indicators for the type of owner. In the
following three columns, estimates for the interaction terms with the indicators for
dispersed ownership, control by a private shareholder, and control by the government
are shown. That is, control by a corporate shareholder is the reference ownership
type for the probability of a control transfer. The impact of a firm characteristic on
the probability of a control transfer can therefore be directly seen in the first column
if the firm is controlled by a corporate shareholder. For the firms with other types
of owners, the impact is obtained by adding the coefficient in the respective column
to the coefficient in the first column.
Regarding failure, all results from Section 4.1 remain qualitatively unchanged;
therefore, we do not comment on them further. In contrast, regarding a change in
control we find some important differences compared to the models in Table 4, where
the type of owner is not interacted with firm-specific characteristics. In particular,
we find that the impact of performance on the probability of a control transfer does
not significantly differ across ownership types; the parameter estimates in columns
two to four of Table 5 are insignificant. Hence, we do not find empirical support
for Hypothesis S1 that shareholders differ in their reaction to poor performance.
However, we find support for Hypothesis S2 that shareholders react differently to
financial pressure. The effect of financial pressure is not statistically different from
zero for firms under control of a corporate shareholder. This is consistent with the
notion that corporate shareholders have access to internal capital markets which can
be used for cash transfers within conglomerates (Lamont, 1997). In contrast, firms
appear to be more likely to be sold when being under control of a private owner. This
supports the notion of liquidity constraints which should be particularly relevant for
private investors. In turn, firms with dispersed ownership as well as firms under
control of the government are not statistically different from firms under control of
a corporate shareholder in their reaction to financial pressure.
A closer look at the estimated effects of ownership concentration provides some
interesting insights. Hypothesis C3 predicts a non-linear impact of ownership con-
centration on trades of control blocks, or more precisely, a positive impact for low
concentration and a negative impact for high concentration. Figure 1 helps to inter-
pret the estimated polynomial. For different shareholder types (dispersed, private,
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corporate) it shows the predicted probability that a firm will experience a change in
control, given its actual characteristics for different hypothetical values of the Herfin-
dahl index, our measure of share concentration. Figure 1 shows these probabilities,
averaged over all firms observed for the three types of controlling shareholders. The
lines are drawn for the values of the Herfindahl index between the 10th and the 90th
percentile of the firms in these groups.
There are two major results that can be learned from Figure 1. First, the effect
of ownership concentration is strong. Compared to a firm with a fully dispersed
ownership structure (Herfindahl is approximately zero), a firm with four equally
large shareholders (Herfindahl index is 0.25) is almost twice as likely to experience
a change in ownership. Second, the estimated shape of the curve for dispersed ow-
nership differs from the shape for firms under tight control. While the former has
the shape as predicted in Hypothesis C3, the latter ones have a negative slope for
all values of the Herfindahl index, and the second order term leads to a minimum
probability roughly at maximum concentration (Herfindahl index is one). Owner-
ship concentration apparently has different impacts on these two groups of firms. We
argue that different effects of ownership concentration depending on the tightness of
control are reasonable. The positive impact predicted for very low concentration and
observed for dispersed shares can be due to the free-riding behavior of very small
shareholders which may prevent takeovers (Grossman and Hart, 1980). As concen-
tration increases while firms remain under the influence of several large minority
shareholders, the agency problem persists since management is not subject to tight
control of one dominant shareholder. At the same time, the costs associated with
block purchases should shrink as it becomes easier for a potential buyer to contact
all major shareholders. For firms under tight control of only one large shareholder,
communication costs should be the lowest because there is a single counter party
to make the deal with (Burkart et al., 2000). But further increasing ownership con-
centration reduces the firm’s stock market liquidity, as argued by Holmstro¨m and
Tirole (1993). This effect overcompensates the effect of decreasing communication
costs and altogether makes a control transfer less likely.
4.3 The type of buyer in control transfers
As argued in Section 2.3, the type of the buyer could also play an important role
in control transactions. To address this issue we split the outcome change into four
outcomes: change to dispersed ownership, change to private owner, change to corpo-
rate owner, and change to government. The purpose of this model is to test whether
some firm-specific characteristics vary in their impact on the probability of a change
in control, depending on the type buyer.
Regarding failure, again all results from Section 4.1 remain qualitatively unchan-
ged; therefore, we do not comment on them further. Regarding control transfers,
similar to the evidence on the type of seller, as discussed in Section 4.2, we find
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that the type of buyer should not be ignored when investigating the determinants
of control transfers and failure. In particular, we find that the performance coeffi-
cients are not statistically different from zero for firms under private, corporate, or
dispersed ownership; only the coefficients for failure and change to government are
significantly negative (Table 6). These results imply that poorly performing firms
are more likely to be sold to the government, and that they are also more likely to
fail. But there is no evidence that corporate shareholders are somehow more likely
than other types of shareholders to buy a poorly performing firm. Hence, there is
no empirical support for Hypothesis B1.
Table 6 also shows that firms with a large burden of debt are more likely to be
sold to a corporate shareholder, and that they are also more likely to fail (compared
with the reference outcome of no change). The respective coefficients for other types
of shareholders are also positive but insignificant. An additional Wald test shows,
however, that the difference between the coefficients for all types of shareholders is
statistically zero. Therefore, there is also no evidence supporting Hypothesis B2.
In contrast, we find strong support forHypothesis B3 that the impact of firm size
on the probability of a control transfer differs, depending on the type of buyer. Large
firms are less likely to be purchased by private as well as corporate shareholders. The
impact of firm size is most pronounced for private shareholders, whose coefficient is
higher in absolute terms than the coefficient for corporate shareholders.4 When a
firm is bought by the government or sold to the public (dispersed ownership), firm
size apparently does not matter. These findings are broadly consistent with evidence
provided by Bethel et al. (1998) and Mulherin and Boone (2000) who report for the
US that firm size reduces the likelihood of an acquisition. However, we find that
for the sale of German corporations this type of liquidity constraint applies only to
private and corporate buyers, not to the government.
As a check of robustness, we also estimated a model that includes different types
of buyers and different types of sellers simultaneously. The total number of 92 coef-
ficients to be estimated reduces the degrees of freedom noticeably. We find that the
main results as presented in this and the previous section remain unchanged; see
Tables 7 and 8.
4.4 A more flexible econometric model
In the previous sections, we based our estimates on the multinomial logit (MNL) mo-
del. The computational simplicity of the MNL model comes at costs since it imposes
strong restrictions on the stochastic structure. To check whether our results are sen-
sitive to these restrictions, we estimate a mixed multinomial logit (MMNL) model.
This econometric approach generalizes the MNL model and is much more flexible.
4 AWald test shows that the difference between both coefficients is significant at the ten-percent
level.
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In contrast to the simple MNL model, it allows for contemporaneous correlations
of the probabilities for different outcomes as well as for intertemporal correlations
emerging from unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity in panel data.
In general, the probability that for firm n at time t the outcome i is realized is
modeled as
P int =
∫
exnt
′

i+zi
′
nt∑
j∈C e
xnt′j+zj ′nt
f(γnt|θ) dγnt. (1)
The vector xnt contains the firm-specific explanatory variables and the vector β
i
the associated outcome-specific parameters as in the simple MNL model. Additio-
nally, the term zi
′
γn is included in the MMNL specification. In our application, z
i
contains indicator variables for the outcomes as will be discussed below. The vector
γnt contains random variables. In this application, they are assumed to be normally
distributed with zero means and covariances as well as unknown variances, which
are collected in the vector θ.
We specify two different kinds of these additional random terms:
• Some of the γnt are specified to be independently distributed both over firms
and over time. The associated indicator variables in zi let these random va-
riables enter more than one alternative. They constitute random shocks that
jointly make these outcomes more or less likely and generate correlations of
these events. As a result, the IIA assumption of the MNL model is relaxed.
• Other elements of γnt are assumed to be independently distributed over firms
but constant over time for each firm. They constitute firm-specific random
effects and generate the correlations of the outcome probabilities over time
that are typical for panel data models.
In this way we specify a substantially more flexible econometric model than the
MNL. In general, the MMNL approach allows the weights zi of the random variables
to vary by decision maker and time, too. McFadden and Train (2000) show that the
choice probabilities generated by any random utility maximization model can be
approximated arbitrarily closely by a MMNL model. The MMNL model has been
successfully used in different applied studies; see for example Brownstone and Train
(1999). Because of the multi-dimensional integral in equation (1), there is no closed-
form solution for the log likelihood function. We estimate this model by the method
of maximum simulated likelihood (MSL).5
Table 9 compares Model (1), which was presented in Table 4, with a correspon-
ding MMNL model. In this model, we include unobserved heterogeneity of control
transfers and a correlation between the outcomes change and fail. The intuition for a
5 See Hajivassiliou and Ruud (1994). We benefitted greatly from the GAUSS code for the MSL
estimation of mixed logit models provided by Kenneth Train.
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correlation between these two outcomes is that to a certain extent both alternatives
can be regarded as substitutes, for example in times of financial distress. We find
that in the MMNL model both added parameters are significantly different from
zero. Note that the MNL model constrains them to be equal to zero. In addition,
we conduct a likelihood ratio test on the null hypothesis of the validity of the MNL
model: It rejects the MNL in favor of the MMNL model. Despite these findings, the
estimates for all other parameters are not qualitatively different between the two
models. Therefore, the results obtained above using the MNL model appear not to
be sensitive to the inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity or correlations between the
alternatives.
Furthermore, we estimate a MMNL model for the type of buyers, corresponding to
Model (4). The specification of the contemporaneous correlation structure resembles
the structure of a multi-level nested logit model, which is depicted in Figure 2.
The outcomes change and fail are allowed to be similar to each other. This is
reflected in a common node. The different change to ... outcomes are allowed to
be even more similar to each other; therefore, they share a further node. Finally, the
outcomes change to a private owner, change to a corporate owner, and change to
the government are also allowed to be similar to each other because they all involve
the presence of a dominant owner after the change in control. A third node reflects
this situation graphically.
The results of this model are shown in Table 10. Again, the MNL model is clearly
rejected, indicating unobserved heterogeneity as well as correlations between the
outcomes. Nevertheless, again we find that the estimated parameters are not quali-
tatively different between this MMNL model and the MNL model in Table 6, which
examines the type of buyer. We conclude that our empirical findings from Sections
4.1-4.3 are generally not sensitive to different econometric specifications.
4.5 Other sensitivity checks
To check whether our results are sensitive to the chosen measures of performance
and financial pressure, we perform a number of estimations in which we additionally
include alternative measures for these firm characteristics. Table 11 shows the re-
sults for the basic MNL model with alternative measures of performance. Model (1)
is the MNL model shown in Table 4, which has been discussed in Section 4.1. In
Models (1a) through (1c), we add the following performance measures: total factor
productivity, annual stock market return, and cash flow on equity. Similar to re-
turn on assets (ROA), these measures are industry-adjusted in the sense that they
measure the difference to median industry performance (two-digit industry level).
Only stock market return is market-adjusted in the sense that it is corrected for the
return of the DAFOX, the size-weighted return of all German stocks. The three new
performance measures have missing values for some of the observations. Therefo-
re, sample size decreases when adding these alternative measures. For stock market
return this is obvious because it can be calculated only for listed firms.
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Table 11 shows that none of the additional coefficients is statistically different
from zero, and a test of the hypothesis that they are jointly zero cannot be rejected;
for the test statistic, see the last row. Note that the other coefficients hardly change
when a new performance variable is included. We infer from this robustness test
that return on assets, which we include in all regressions, picks up all relevant
information regarding performance. Therefore we are confident that its inclusion
in the regressions suffices, and that we can ignore the other performance variables.
If they do not contain any additional information, they will only lead to inefficient
estimates.
We proceed analogously for different measures of financial pressure. The results of
these estimates are shown in Table 12. We find that only the current ratio, a measure
of liquidity, has a weakly significant coefficient. But its influence is small, and the
other parameters do not change qualitatively when the current ratio is included.
Note that we loose roughly ten percent of observations due to missing information
when the current ratio is included in the specification. This leads to inefficiencies
and, if the firms we must drop differ systematically from the remaining firms, also to
sample selection bias. Hence, we decide not to include this variable in our analysis.
As argued before, this decision does not seem to influence our main findings.
Finally, firm-specific characteristics such as performance could be affected in the
year when a change in control takes place. If this is the case, then our explanato-
ry variables could be systematically different from their normal values, and hence
should at least be questionable as determinants of an acquisition or a failure that
takes place in the following year. To check whether our results are affected by this
problem, we re-estimate Model (1) from Section 4.1 excluding all firm years in which
a change in control takes place. We find essentially the same results. Only the second-
order term of the Herfindahl index looses its significance, and the pyramid dummy
becomes significantly negative at the five-percent level.
5 Conclusions
This study provides an improved understanding of the dynamics of corporate ow-
nership and firm survival in Germany. In particular, we consider the role of different
types of shareholders as sellers and buyers of control blocks. The empirical analysis
is based on a sample of over 1,500 large and medium-sized German corporations for
the years 1986–1995.
There are two major findings. First, poor performance and high financial pressure
make firms more likely to fail and to experience a change in ownership. This latter
finding contrasts with the widespread belief that acquisitions target well-performing
firms to the disadvantage of shareholders and other stakeholders. Rather, our finding
is consistent with the view that acquisitions can have a disciplining effect on poorly
performing firms (Denis and Sarin, 1999; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001). Our second
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major finding is that both the type of seller and the type of buyer matter in transfers
of corporate control. This implies that not taking into account different shareholder
types in control transactions can bias estimation results. This is a classical omitted
variables problem. Bo¨rsch-Supan and Ko¨ke (2000) discuss this and other common
methodological problems in corporate governance studies in detail.
For illustration, take the example of ownership concentration. We find that con-
centration reduces the likelihood of a change in ownership when we do not control
for the type of seller. Controlling for the type of seller, we find that (1) this effect
is not monotonous but rather non-linear in the degree of ownership concentration,
and that (2) this non-linearity depends on whether a firm is initially under tight or
under loose control of shareholders. More precisely, for firms with a highly dispersed
ownership structure the probability of a change in ownership increases with share
concentration, but it decreases when concentration exceeds a particular level. Firms
with three or four equally large shareholders are most likely to be acquired. One
interpretation for the positive impact of concentration on the likelihood of a change
in control is that free-riding of small shareholders increases the costs of a change
in control, and therefore makes a control change less likely. Vice versa, when con-
centration becomes too large, capital markets might not be able to determine the
necessity of an acquisition any longer (Holmstro¨m and Tirole, 1993). This implies
a lower probability of a change in control for firms without a sufficiently disper-
sed ownership structure. In combination, our findings stress the importance of the
existing concentration of shares at the outset of negotiations over corporate con-
trol transactions. Burkart et al. (2000) provide important theoretical work in this
direction.
The other findings of this study can be summarized as follows: Irrespective of the
type of the controlling shareholder, firms are more likely to fail and to experience
a change in ownership when financial pressure is high and firm size is small. This
is consistent with previous studies (see, e.g., Altman, 1968; Bethel et al., 1998;
Zingales, 1998). In contrast, complex ownership structures, reflected for example in
cross ownership, reduce the likelihood for a change in control. This is consistent with
theoretical predictions (Bebchuk et al., 2000). Concerning the type of seller, private
owners are more likely to sell a firm when financial pressure increases, but corporate
shareholders are not. This is consistent with evidence that corporate owners have
access to internal capital markets (Lamont, 1997), and that private owners face
some liquidity constraints. Regarding the buyers of control blocks, large firms are
less likely to be sold to a corporate shareholder than to the government, and they are
even less likely to be sold to a private shareholder. Again, the latter finding suggests
that private owners are liquidity-constrained. Interestingly, firms under control of
cross-owned shareholders, which are by definition corporate shareholders, are more
likely to be sold to the public or the government, but less likely to be sold to
another corporate investor. This indicates that, if complex ownership structures are
dissolved, then this is done either by spreading shares widely or by selling control
blocks to the government.
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Our findings have policy implications. The finding that poorly performing firms
are more likely to be acquired is consistent with the notion that acquisitions can
play an important governance role. At the same time, we find that firms with com-
plex ownership structures, reflected for example in cross ownership, are less likely
to experience an acquisition. This indicates that ownership complexity acts as a
takeover deterrent. In combination, these results suggest that a policy attempting
to reduce ownership complexity could make the market for corporate control more
active. In turn, tighter managerial control by market forces could enhance the ef-
ficiency of corporate governance. Currently, in most European countries dissolving
complex ownership structures is costly because capital gains from sales of corporate
assets are subject to the regular corporate tax. Lang et al. (2001) argue that this tax
increases the transaction costs associated with block trades, and therefore acts as a
barrier to efficient allocation of ownership and investment. Recognizing the benefits
of a more active market for corporate control, Germany has abolished this tax on
capital gains, starting January 2002. When this part of the tax reform proves to
reduce the transaction costs associated with block trades and to support structural
change, it might be recommendable for other continental European countries where
corporate ownership is often complex as well (La Porta et al., 1999).
A potential problem of our approach might be that some of our regressors are
endogenous, in particular performance. Since we use lagged values of our explana-
tory variables, the potential sources of endogeneity are not changes in performance
during or after takeovers. Neither does our study suffer from a direct link between
ownership types and performance, which is examined for example by Brickley et al.
(1988) who regress performance on ownership types. But if the market for corporate
control indeed works as a disciplinary device (Jensen, 1988), already the threat of
an acquisition should increase firm performance. This creates a positive causal rela-
tionship between the probability of a change in control and firm performance, and
therefore might lead to coefficient estimates that do not represent the causal effect
of performance on the probability of a control change. As this discussion shows, one
would expect the estimates to be biased downwards in absolute value by this endoge-
neity. Therefore, our estimates of the coefficients for performance can be interpreted
as a lower bound for the causal effect on the control change probability. An econo-
metric approach that jointly models the endogeneity of control transfers and firm
performance could give further insights about the causal interdependence of these
important variables. Finally, our approach of taking into account differences between
shareholder types could be extended to model the effects that different shareholder
types have on corporate governance and efficiency. Evidence on this issue is particu-
larly important as one group of shareholders, the institutional investors, is steadily
gaining influence on corporate policy (see, e.g., Smith, 1996). But this is beyond the
scope of this paper and will be left for future research.
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A Data sources and sample selection
The first main pillar of data comes from Hoppenstedt’s Balance Sheet Database
(BSD). An important feature of this data source is that it contains information on
listed and non-listed incorporated firms, both for public (AG) and private corpo-
rations (GmbH). We take 1986 as the starting year because a change in disclosure
rules hinders comparability of the annual reports before and after the year 1986.6
The last year of our investigation is 1996 because our series of ownership data ends
in this year. For the period 1986–1996, BSD contains 5,679 firms (31,294 firm years)
for which consolidated balance sheet data are available. We eliminate firms from
the utility, traffic, and telecommunications industries because they were still pre-
dominantly government-owned during the period of observation. As a matter of
comparability, we also eliminate firms which primarily operate in the banking and
insurance business, while operating little in non-financial activities. In combination,
selection by industry causes 1,928 firm deletions.
The second main pillar–data on ownership structures–is obtained from annual
reports published by former Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechsel-Bank (in short,
Hypobank). These reports contain information on direct ownership of common stock
(Stammaktien) for all listed German firms. In addition, Hypobank provides informa-
tion on direct ownership of common stock for large non-listed firms (Stammaktien
for the non-listed AG and Gesellschafteranteile for the GmbH which cannot be li-
sted). Hypobank reports the size and the name of a direct owner when the size of
the ownership block exceeds five percent. In general, ownership rights as reported
by Hypobank correspond to voting rights (see Ko¨ke, 2000).
Ownership information from Hypobank cannot readily be used in our analysis for
three reasons. First, ownership information from Hypobank only refers to the di-
rect level of owners. But the present analysis requires to identify the ultimate owner
of each sample firm (see Appendix B). Second, Hypobank does not directly reve-
al ownership information on medium-sized non-listed firms. Other commercial data
sources are also of little help because during our period of observation, non-listed
firms generally have not been subject to strictly enforced disclosure requirements.
Therefore, we construct the relevant ownership structures by searching the infor-
mation on investments in subsidiaries and affiliated companies which is given in
the appendix to each company in Hypobank. In addition, we search the Mannheim
Company Database (MUP) located at the ZEW in Mannheim. Thereby we obtain
ownership structures on many medium-sized non-listed firms, mainly for private
corporations (GmbH). Third, some firms changed their names during the period
of observation, for example following takeovers or restructuring of conglomerates.
Since changes in ownership are crucial to the data collection procedure, we adjust
6 In 1985 several changes were introduced in German corporate law (§289 HGB), most of them
triggered by the European Community’s Fourth Company Law Directive on the harmoniza-
tion of national requirements pertaining to financial statements.
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for name changes and obtain a panel on ownership structures through the years
1986–1996.
Furthermore, we drop firms with less than two consecutive years for which owner-
ship information is available because our analysis requires to calculate changes in
ownership (2,216 firm deletions). Since our analysis focuses on the year prior to the
year in which a change in ownership or firm failure occurs, we exclude firm-years
for which no ownership data in the following year are available. For most firms this
is the year 1996, the final year of the sample. Finally, 25 firms must be eliminated
due to missing values on the variables used in the empirical analysis. This selection
procedure leaves 1,510 firms (7,577 firm years) for the years 1986–1995. Table 13
summarizes the selection procedure.
B Concept of control
Large German corporations typically show complex ownership structures such as
pyramids with several layers of ownership and cross ownership between firms (La
Porta et al., 1999; Bo¨hmer, 2000; Ko¨ke, 2001a). For Germany such analysis of direct
ownership is therefore not sufficient. By using the concept of ultimate ownership it
becomes possible to define corporate control within complex ownership structures.
This requires the analysis of control chains throughout several levels and the iden-
tification of a most powerful ultimate owner if any such exists. We use the concept
of ultimate ownership in this study.
The identification of the ultimate owner for each firm is based upon German
corporate law and involves two steps. First, we identify the ultimate owner for each
direct shareholder using the following three rules. Rule 1 (strong ownership rule): A
chain of control is pursued to the next level if the shareholder being analyzed is owned
to 50% or more by a shareholder on the next level, while all other shareholders on the
next level own less than 50%. Rule 2 (weak ownership rule): If rule 1 does not apply,
a chain of control is pursued to the next level if the shareholder being analyzed is
owned to 25% or more by a shareholder on the next level, while all other shareholders
on the next level own less than 25%. Rule 3 (stop rule): If neither rule 1 nor rule
2 applies, a chain of control is not pursued further. These rules guarantee that no
more than one ultimate owner is identified for each direct shareholder. Note that
if a shareholder has split his ownership stake in a particular company into several
smaller stakes, for example into two blocks of 50% held by two subsidiary firms, we
combine these smaller stakes into one single block. We set the first cut-off point at
50% because German law allows an investor owning 50% of all shares to appoint
management.7 The second cut-off point is set at 25% because an investor owning
25% of the shares has the right to veto decisions. In a second step in determining
7 A 50% majority is sufficient to dismiss management after their regular period of office. But
a majority of 75% is required to dismiss management during its period of office (§103 (1)
AktG).
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the ultimate owner for each sample firm, we apply the three rules to all direct
shareholders. This allows us to identify one single shareholder that is in ultimate
control. When no single shareholder fulfills the criteria, this firm is seen to have no
ultimate owner.
C Definition of variables
The definition of all variables used in this study can be found in Table 14.
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Table 1: Sample composition in 1992: Listed and non-listed firms
Listing Legal form All German firms Sample firms
total in percent in percent of
of total all German firms
Yes AG, KGaA 521 359 51.0% 68.9%
No AG, KGaA 1,643 233 33.1% 14.2%
No GmbH 359,358 112 15.9% 0.03%
Total 361,522 704 100.0% 0.2%
Notes: Data on all German firms are obtained from Statistisches Bundesamt, Umsatz-
steuerstatistik, Fachserie 14, Reihe 8.
Table 2: Frequency of control transfers and failure
Type of blockholder
Total Dispersed Private Corporate Government
(1) Status in t− 1 7,577 857 2,514 3,806 400
(2) No change 6,963 757 2,336 3,519 351
(3) Block sold 576 96 159 275 46
(4) Block bought 576 76 114 353 33
(5) Failure 38 4 19 12 3
(6) Status in t 7,539 833 2,450 3,872 384
Notes: For the definition of shareholder types see Appendix C. The rows have the following
relations: (1) = (2) + (3) + (5); (6) = (1) − (3) + (4)− (5) = (2) + (4).
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Table 3: Antecedents of control transfers and failure
Mean Median
Change in No change Failure Change in No change Failure
control control
Return-on-assets -0.2%∗ 1.0% -9.6%∗∗ -0.3%∗∗ 0.4% -5.2%∗∗
Debt-to-assets 45.4%∗∗ 41.5% 56.1%∗∗ 43.9%∗∗ 40.7% 63.3%∗∗
Interest coverage 56.9∗ 100.2 19.4∗∗ 2.8∗∗ 4.4 0.2∗∗
Ownership 56.6%** 68.1% 57.1%+ 54.6%∗∗ 86.5% 60.4%∗
concentration
Pyramid 51.4% 51.6% 31.6%∗ 100.0% 100.0% 0.0%∗
Level of pyramid 2.0∗ 1.8 1.5∗ 2.0 2.0 1.0∗
Cross ownership 6.4% 8.3% 0.0%+ 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%+
Total assets 958.9∗∗ 1710.0 662.7∗∗ 192.1∗∗ 231.6 122.1∗
Notes: Mean and median values calculated for firms which experience a change in owner-
ship or failure versus mean and median values calculated for surviving firms which do not
experience a change in control. The statistics are calculated for the year prior to the year
in which the survival status is observed. The test statistics are heteroskedastic t-tests of
equal means (columns 1 vs. 2, and 2 vs. 3) and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests of equal medians
(columns 4 vs. 5, and 5 vs. 6). **, *, + indicates significance at the 1, 5, and 10-percent
levels, respectively.
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Table 4: Models (1) and (2), MNL model of control transfer and failure
Model (1) (2)
Outcome (reference: No change) Change Fail Change Fail
Industry-adjusted ROA −0.858 * −5.842 ** −0.814 * −5.848 **
(2.10) (4.45) (1.99) (4.45)
Debt-to-assets ratio 0.620 ** 2.332 ** 0.645 ** 2.325 **
(3.13) (3.12) (3.26) (3.11)
Herfindahl index −2.107 ** 0.657 −2.104 ** 0.674
(3.65) (0.27) (3.13) (0.28)
Herfindahl index2 0.929 + −1.640 0.883 −1.652
(1.84) (0.79) (1.59) (0.79)
Pyramid −0.220 −1.047 + −0.209 −1.048 +
(1.60) (1.67) (1.50) (1.67)
Level in pyramid 0.265 ** 0.035 0.250 ** 0.034
(4.37) (0.11) (3.88) (0.11)
Cross ownership −0.299 + −0.420 *
(1.67) (2.25)
log(Assets) −0.100 ** −0.183 * −0.105 ** −0.183 *
(4.39) (2.13) (4.61) (2.13)
Listed −0.047 −4.335 ** −0.004 −4.332 **
(0.41) (4.23) (0.03) (4.23)
GmbH −0.142 −2.404 ** −0.165 −2.400 **
(1.06) (4.74) (1.23) (4.73)
Time trend 0.002 0.421 ** 0.000 0.421 **
(0.11) (4.34) (0.03) (4.34)
Ownership type (reference: Corporate)
Dispersed −0.206
(1.25)
Private −0.353 **
(3.20)
Government 0.164
(0.87)
Number of observations: 7, 577 7, 577
Log Likelihood: −2, 142.9 −2, 136.1
LR test against constants only: 261.9 ** (21 d.f.) 275.5 ** (24 d.f.)
LR test model (2) against (1): 13.6 ** (3 d.f.)
Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. Constants are included but not reported.
**, *, +: significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, 10-percent level, respectively.
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Table 5: Model (3), Interactions with type of seller
Outcome Change Change (difference to corporate) Fail
Type Corporate Dispersed Private Government
Industry-adjusted ROA −0.937 + −0.079 0.714 0.182 −5.849 **
(1.69) (0.05) (0.79) (0.10) (4.46)
Debt-to-assets ratio 0.279 0.511 1.111 * 0.470 2.344 **
(1.01) (0.83) (2.22) (0.59) (3.14)
Herfindahl index −3.863 ** 8.722 ** −0.418 1.764 0.680
(3.53) (3.35) (0.22) (0.53) (0.28)
Herfindahl index2 2.118 * −11.031 * 0.573 −0.970 −1.662
(2.34) (2.09) (0.36) (0.36) (0.80)
Pyramid −0.239 0.762 −0.657 + 2.033 ** −1.043 +
(1.13) (1.47) (1.89) (3.17) (1.67)
Level in pyramid 0.170 −0.444 0.552 ** −0.428 * 0.026
(1.55) (1.34) (3.49) (2.25) (0.08)
Cross ownership −0.407 *
(2.12)
log(Assets) −0.096 ** −0.034 −0.041 0.073 −0.186 *
(2.91) (0.53) (0.68) (0.72) (2.16)
Listed 0.078 −0.352 0.075 −0.010 −4.332 **
(0.47) (1.04) (0.27) (0.02) (4.23)
GmbH −0.216 −0.550 0.208 0.551 −2.408 **
(1.20) (1.05) (0.61) (1.10) (4.75)
Time trend 0.024 −0.044 0.026 −0.273 ** 0.421 **
(0.92) (0.93) (0.61) (3.85) (4.35)
Number of observations: 7, 577
Log Likelihood: −2, 081.3
LR test against constants only: 385.0 ** (54 d.f.)
LR test against Model (2): 109.6 ** (30 d.f.)
Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. Constants are included but not reported.
**, *, +: significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, 10-percent level, respectively.
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Table 6: Model (4), Splitting the types of buyers
Outcome Change to... Fail
Dispersed Private Corporate Government
Industry-adjusted ROA −1.683 −0.656 −0.638 −2.981 + −5.844 **
(1.35) (0.75) (1.28) (1.92) (4.45)
Debt-to-assets ratio 0.603 0.601 0.617 * 0.698 2.332 **
(1.05) (1.40) (2.51) (0.85) (3.12)
Herfindahl index −1.076 0.052 −2.219 ** −4.739 + 0.688
(0.76) (0.04) (2.86) (1.81) (0.28)
Herfindahl index2 −3.016 * −0.929 1.398 * 3.422 −1.660
(2.00) (0.87) (2.09) (1.48) (0.80)
Pyramid 0.009 −1.111 ** −0.014 0.441 −1.041 +
(0.02) (2.84) (0.08) (0.79) (1.66)
Level in pyramid 0.174 0.090 0.337 ** −0.204 0.031
(0.82) (0.45) (5.02) (0.75) (0.10)
Cross ownership 0.710 + −0.381 −1.577 ** 2.280 **
(1.91) (0.82) (4.34) (6.11)
log(Assets) −0.042 −0.204 ** −0.107 ** 0.110 −0.184 *
(0.69) (4.10) (3.69) (1.16) (2.14)
Listed 0.371 0.224 −0.249 + 0.230 −4.327 **
(1.08) (0.89) (1.72) (0.43) (4.22)
GmbH 0.400 0.233 −0.348 * 0.368 −2.398 **
(0.89) (0.72) (2.20) (0.70) (4.73)
Time trend 0.026 −0.007 −0.010 0.082 0.420 **
(0.59) (0.20) (0.47) (1.11) (4.34)
Number of observations: 7, 577
Log Likelihood: −2, 644.3
LR test against constants only: 470.7 ** (54 d.f.)
Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. Constants are included but not reported.
**, *, +: significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, 10-percent level, respectively.
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Table 7: Model (5), Full model: interactions with type of seller
Outcome Change to corporate Fail
Effect absolute relative to corporate seller
Seller Type Corporate Dispersed Private Government
Industry-adjusted ROA −0.685 −0.011 0.591 0.051 −5.851 **
(1.09) (0.01) (0.65) (0.03) (4.46)
Debt-to-assets ratio 0.271 0.503 1.077 * 0.504 2.345 **
(0.86) (0.81) (2.14) (0.63) (3.14)
Herfindahl index −3.224 * 7.637 ** −1.030 1.393 0.693
(2.56) (2.92) (0.54) (0.42) (0.28)
Herfindahl index2 2.001 + −9.883 + 1.004 −0.765 −1.669
(1.92) (1.87) (0.63) (0.28) (0.81)
Pyramid −0.108 0.834 −0.533 2.114 ** −1.039 +
(0.46) (1.59) (1.52) (3.28) (1.66)
Level in pyramid 0.289 * −0.489 0.471 ** −0.506 ** 0.025
(2.42) (1.47) (2.93) (2.63) (0.08)
Cross ownership −1.623 **
(4.38)
log(Assets) −0.113 ** −0.025 −0.023 0.088 −0.186 *
(3.01) (0.38) (0.37) (0.87) (2.17)
Listed −0.150 −0.360 0.137 0.087 −4.327 **
(0.78) (1.05) (0.48) (0.14) (4.22)
GmbH −0.456 * −0.600 0.284 0.682 −2.404 **
(2.21) (1.14) (0.83) (1.35) (4.74)
Time trend 0.010 −0.042 0.034 −0.266 ** 0.421 **
(0.33) (0.88) (0.80) (3.74) (4.35)
Number of observations: 7, 577
Log Likelihood: −2, 586.2
LR test against constants only: 586.8 ** (87 d.f.)
Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. Constants are included but not reported.
**, *, +: significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, 10-percent level, respectively.
The interactions with the type of buyer that are also included in this model are
shown in Table 8.
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Table 8: Model (5) continued, Full model: interactions with type of buyer
Outcome Change Change to ...(difference to corporate)
Shareholder Type Corporate Dispersed Private Government
Industry-adjusted ROA −0.685 −0.927 0.019 −2.318
(1.09) (0.69) (0.02) (1.42)
Debt-to-assets ratio 0.271 −0.004 0.057 0.207
(0.86) (0.01) (0.12) (0.24)
Herfindahl index −3.224 * 0.555 2.239 −2.880
(2.56) (0.33) (1.49) (0.99)
Herfindahl index2 2.001 + −3.781 * −2.232 + 2.441
(1.92) (2.26) (1.71) (0.96)
Pyramid −0.108 −0.066 −1.065 * 0.413
(0.46) (0.15) (2.49) (0.71)
Level in pyramid 0.289 * −0.099 −0.249 −0.485 +
(2.42) (0.42) (1.17) (1.71)
Cross ownership −1.623 ** 2.052 ** 1.049 + 3.732 **
(4.38) (3.91) (1.78) (7.22)
log(Assets) −0.113 ** 0.072 −0.090 0.218 *
(3.01) (1.05) (1.59) (2.18)
Listed −0.150 0.610 + 0.470 0.420
(0.78) (1.65) (1.64) (0.75)
GmbH −0.456 * 0.812 + 0.584 0.711
(2.21) (1.69) (1.62) (1.29)
Time trend 0.010 0.039 −0.009 0.087
(0.33) (0.80) (0.21) (1.13)
Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. Constants are included but not reported.
**, *, +: significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, 10-percent level, respectively.
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Table 9: MNL and MMNL model of control transfer and failure
Model MNL = Model (1) Mixed Logit (MMNL)
Outcome (reference: No change) Change Fail Change Fail
Industry-adjusted ROA −0.858 * −5.842 ** −0.866 * −6.031 **
(2.10) (4.45) (2.01) (4.25)
Debt-to-assets ratio 0.620 ** 2.332 ** 0.659 ** 2.355 **
(3.13) (3.12) (3.10) (2.82)
Herfindahl index −2.107 ** 0.657 −2.430 ** 0.460
(3.65) (0.27) (3.70) (0.17)
Herfindahl index2 0.929 + −1.640 1.122 * −1.538
(1.84) (0.79) (1.97) (0.72)
Pyramid −0.220 −1.047 + −0.263 + −1.064 +
(1.60) (1.67) (1.70) (1.74)
Level in pyramid 0.265 ** 0.035 0.284 ** 0.048
(4.37) (0.11) (4.27) (0.16)
Cross ownership −0.299 + −0.333
(1.67) (1.60)
log(Assets) −0.100 ** −0.183 * −0.108 ** −0.190 **
(4.39) (2.13) (4.07) (2.62)
Listed −0.047 −4.335 ** −0.072 −4.388 **
(0.41) (4.23) (0.53) (4.14)
GmbH −0.142 −2.404 ** −0.155 −2.440 **
(1.06) (4.74) (1.05) (4.68)
Time trend 0.002 0.421 ** 0.004 0.428 **
(0.11) (4.34) (0.22) (5.64)
Std. dev. of firm-specific random effects (unobs. heterogeneity):
Change 0 0.561**
(constr.) (4.68)
Std. dev. of contemporaneous shocks (correlations):
Change & Fail 0 0.674*
(constr.) (2.42)
Number of observations: 7, 577 7, 577
Log Likelihood: −2, 142.9 −2, 135.8
LR test MNL against MMNL: 14.2 ** (2 d.f.)
Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. Constants are included but not reported.
**, *, +: significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, 10-percent level, respectively.
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Table 10: MMNL model for buyers, corresponds to Model (4)
Outcome Change to...
FailDispersed Private Corporate Government
Industry-adjusted ROA −1.636 −0.709 −0.781 −3.292 + −6.332 **
(0.97) (0.67) (1.50) (1.69) (4.03)
Debt-to-assets ratio 0.390 0.690 0.750 * 0.867 2.352 *
(0.57) (1.25) (2.41) (0.83) (2.19)
Herfindahl index −8.741 ** −0.364 −2.670 ** −5.410 + 0.262
(4.02) (0.26) (2.61) (1.80) (0.09)
Herfindahl index2 3.046 −0.766 1.603 + 3.746 −1.381
(1.55) (0.61) (1.89) (1.39) (0.49)
Pyramid −0.205 −1.182 ** −0.117 0.503 −1.223
(0.40) (2.87) (0.57) (0.58) (1.48)
Level in pyramid 0.239 0.137 0.405 ** −0.221 0.229
(0.82) (0.68) (4.44) (0.44) (0.61)
Cross ownership 0.000 −0.444 −1.709 ** 2.304 **
(0.00) (0.82) (4.27) (4.47)
log(Assets) −0.019 −0.224 ** −0.130 ** 0.125 −0.217
(0.21) (3.63) (3.49) (0.86) (1.64)
Listed 0.380 0.145 −0.334 + 0.231 −4.479 **
(0.89) (0.48) (1.95) (0.33) (3.87)
GmbH 0.371 0.167 −0.417 * 0.401 −2.593 **
(0.66) (0.47) (2.17) (0.58) (3.08)
Time trend 0.460 −0.031 −0.064 0.885 4.364 **
(0.93) (0.08) (0.27) (0.76) (2.83)
Std. dev. of firm-specific random effects (unobs. heterogeneity):
Change 0.698**
(4.76)
Std. dev. of contemporaneous shocks (correlations):
All Change Outcomes −0.164*
(0.40)
All Change Outcomes & Fail 1.184*
(3.15)
Number of observations: 7, 577
Log Likelihood: −2, 595.1
LR test against Model (4): 98.5 ** (3 d.f.)
Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. Constants are included but not reported.
**, *, +: significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, 10-percent level, respectively.
Table 11: Robustness tests: Performance variables
Model (1) Model (1a) Model (1b) c Model (4)
Alternative change failure change failure change failure change failure
Industry-adjusted ROA -0.859∗ -5.842∗∗ -0.876+ -6.904∗∗ 0.039 -4.078 -0.905+ -6.687**
(-2.104) (-4.407) (-1.938) (-4.415) (0.043) (-1.609) (-1.927) (-4.306)
Productivity -0.087 -0.172
(-1.36) (-0.842)
Stock market return 0.053 -0.789
(0.198) (-0.958)
Cash Flow on Equity -0.027 0.028
(-0.427) (0.154)
Debt-to-asset ratio 0.620∗∗ 2.300∗∗ 0.835∗∗ 3.557∗∗ 0.937∗ 4.413∗ 0.828∗∗ 2.959**
(3.13) (3.05) (3.584) (3.716) (2.273) (2.553) (3.641) (3.376)
Herfindahl -2.108∗∗ 0.717 -1.889∗∗ 2.136 -2.699∗∗ -11.243∗ -1.806∗∗ 1.872
(-3.65) (0.293) (-3.085) (0.747) (-2.962) (-2.294) (-2.861) (0.689)
Herfindahl2 0.930+ -1.602 0.804 -2.664 1.418 10.659∗ 0.642 -2.508
(1.84) (-0.768) (1.494) (-1.097) (1.58) (2.314) (1.159) (-1.085)
Pyramid -0.220 -1.163+ -0.354∗ -1.638∗ -0.161 -3.175+ -0.432∗∗ -1.832**
(-1.6) (-1.864) (-2.408) (-2.153) (-0.621) (-1.902) (-2.812) (-2.612)
Level in Pyramid 0.265∗∗ 0.182 0.313∗∗ 0.302 0.388∗∗ 1.310 0.316∗∗ 0.452
(4.378) (0.579) (4.989) (0.823) (2.618) (1.452) (4.784) (1.433)
Cross ownership -0.305+ -35.943 -0.290 -38.466 -0.192 -35.481 -0.433∗ -31.275
(-1.702) (0) (-1.476) (-0.0) (-0.607) ( -0.0) (-2.004) (0)
log(assets) -0.100∗∗ -0.191* -0.071∗ -0.406∗∗ -0.102∗ -0.289 -0.082∗∗ -0.340**
(-4.389) (-2.134) (-2.536) (-2.883) (-2.536) (-1.529) (-3.028) (-2.889)
Listed -0.047 -4.333∗∗ -0.063 -4.649∗∗ -0.300 -5.605∗∗ -0.109 -4.423**
(-0.408) (-4.229) (-0.502) (-4.441) (-1.436) (-4.75) (-0.859) (-4.248)
GmbH -0.142 -2.500∗∗ -0.156 -3.050∗∗ -0.357 -36.956 -0.167 -2.739**
(-1.067) (-4.793) (-1.06) (-4.579) (-0.464) (3 -0.0) (-1.119) (-4.512)
Time Trend 0.002 0.420∗∗ 0.003 0.412∗∗ -0.024 0.625∗∗ 0.013 0.362**
(0.112) (4.323) (0.159) (3.84) (-0.85) (3.632) (0.623) (3.457)
Number of observations: 7,577 6,598 2,416 6,371
Log likelihood: -2,140.2 -1,854.6 -739.9 -1,762.0
Wald Test against model (1) ∼ χ22: 2.4646 0.97182 0.21299
Reference alternative: No change. Constants are included but not reported.
**, *, +: significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, 10-percent level, respectively.
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Table 12: Robustness tests: Financial pressure variables
Model (1) Model (1d) Model (1e) Model (1f)
Alternative change failure change failure change failure change failure
Industry-adjusted ROA -0.859∗ -5.842∗∗ -1.146∗∗ -6.028∗∗ -0.869∗ -6.051∗∗ -0.850∗ -5.807**
(-2.104) (-4.407) (-2.689) (-4.426) (-2.03) (-4.502) (-1.984) (-4.347)
Debt-to-assets ratio 0.620∗∗ 2.300∗∗ 0.598∗∗ 2.378∗∗ 0.733∗∗ 2.552∗∗ 0.904∗∗ 2.385**
(3.13) (3.05) (2.844) (2.978) (3.277) (3.209) (4.109) (3.093)
Interest coverage 0.000 0.000
(-0.792) (-0.165)
No working capital 0.090 -0.974+
(0.627) (-1.686)
Current ratio 0.002+ 0.005+
(1.958) (1.839)
Herfindahl -2.108∗∗ 0.717 -1.984∗∗ 0.875 -2.306∗∗ 0.585 -2.272∗∗ 0.805
(-3.65) (0.293) (-3.404) (0.352) (-3.798) (0.237) (-3.732) (0.328)
Herfindahl2 0.930+ -1.602 0.781 -1.675 1.087∗ -1.406 1.052∗ -1.688
(1.84) (-0.768) (1.528) (-0.788) (2.036) (-0.669) (1.967) (-0.804)
Pyramid -0.220 -1.163+ -0.242+ -1.003 -0.230 -1.025 -0.237 -1.071+
(-1.6) (-1.864) (-1.72) (-1.508) (-1.574) (-1.621) (-1.612) (-1.704)
Level in Pyramid 0.265∗∗ 0.182 0.261∗∗ 0.050 0.249∗∗ 0.136 0.252∗∗ 0.151
(4.378) (0.579) (4.21) (0.136) (3.882) (0.422) (3.912) (0.474)
Cross ownership -0.305+ -35.943 -0.216 -31.044 -0.357+ -38.731 -0.375+ -29.400
(-1.702) (0) (-1.201) (0) (-1.806) (-0.0) (-1.888) (0)
log(assets) -0.100∗∗ -0.191* -0.090∗∗ -0.236∗ -0.101∗∗ -0.219∗ -0.095∗∗ -0.193*
(-4.389) (-2.134) (-3.62) (-2.362) (-3.924) (-2.266) (-3.68) (-2.02)
Listed -0.047 -4.333∗∗ -0.069 -4.365∗∗ -0.076 -4.304∗∗ -0.081 -4.331**
(-0.408) (-4.229) (-0.584) (-4.258) (-0.625) (-4.205) (-0.665) (-4.227)
GmbH -0.142 -2.500∗∗ -0.124 -2.687∗∗ -0.186 -2.516∗∗ -0.184 -2.461**
(-1.067) (-4.793) (-0.906) (-4.804) (-1.317) (-4.784) (-1.303) (-4.755)
Time Trend 0.002 0.420∗∗ 0.004 0.433∗∗ 0.022 0.428∗∗ 0.025 0.410**
(0.112) (4.323) (0.221) (4.349) (1.132) (4.263) (1.269) (4.098)
Number of observations: 7,577 7,332 6,935 6,926
Log likelihood: -2,140.2 -2,061.4 -1,935.9 -1,929.3
Wald Test against model (1) ∼ χ22: 0.651 3.309 6.859*
Reference alternative: No change. Constants are included but not reported.
**, *, +: significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, 10-percent level, respectively.
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Table 13: Data selection procedure
Selection criterion Firms Firm years
Consolidated balance sheet data for the years 1986–1996 5,679 31,294
Mining, manufacturing, construction, and trade 3,751 20,614
Two consecutive years of ownership data 1,535 9,000
Ownership information in the following year 1,535 7,746
No missing values 1,510 7,577
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Table 14: Definition of variables
Performance:
Total factor productivity Residual from OLS estimation of Cobb-Douglas
production function, y = αk + βl, with y=ln(total sales),
k=ln(replacement costs of tangible assets) and
l=ln(total number of employees). Sales and capital stock
are deflated using appropriate price indices.
Return-on-assets (ROA) Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT)/total assets
Stock market return Continuous yearly return Rct =
∑n
w=1
Rcw
n ∗ 52 with continuous
weekly return Rcw = ln(
Kpw
Kpw−1
) with Kpw performance value on
Wednesday of week w. Kpw is corrected for capital changes,
changes of stock’s face value, stock splits, and dividend payments.
Cash flow on equity Year’s result plus depreciation and interest payments
divided by the book value of equity
Ownership structure:
Herfindahl index H =
∑n
j=1 P
2
j , with Pj size of individual block
shareholder wins a vote, 0 otherwise: α = Φ( C1√
H−C21
)
Control Control = 1 if firm has ultimately controlling shareholder,
calculated based on concept of control, 0 otherwise
Pyramid Pyramid = 1 if ultimate owner is located on the second or higher
level in the ownership structure
Level of control Level of the end of a control chain in pyramids. For example,
Level = 1 means that control resides with direct shareholder.
Cross ownership Cross = 1 if ultimate owner is part of the web of firms
identified by Wenger and Kaserer (1998) and if ultimate owner
indirectly owns share block in itself; 0 otherwise
Capital structure:
Debt-to-assets ratio Total debt to total assets
Interest coverage EBIT divided by interest payments
No working capital = 1 if short-term assets less short-term liabilities less than zero,
= 0 otherwise
Current ratio Short-term assets divided by short-term liabilities
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Figure 1: Herfindahl index and the probability of control transfers
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The figure shows the simulated probabilities of a transfer of control for the
three types of initially controlling shareholders, given their actual
characteristics and hypothetical values of the Herfindahl index. The lines are
plotted for the range of Herfindahl index values between the 10th and the
90th percentiles of the observed values within the respective groups of firms.
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Figure 2: Contemporaneous correlation structure
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